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Abstract
Premised on two social-psychological perspectives, the cost- reward theory of helping and social exchange
theory, our study made one of the first attempts to explore the processes involved in online knowledge 
sharing among academicians. We collected data from management conference presenters (n=530) by the 
use of quasi-experimental approach. The results revealed that, on receiving a request to share a conference 
paper, academicians’ willingness and their intent to assure a fair exchange were significantly associated 
with costs and benefits of helping and also with perceived social norms of sharing. Only the costs of 
helping variables were significantly related to the intent of academicians to assure a fair exchange.
Keywords 
Knowledge Sharing, Cost-Reward Theory of Helping, Social Exchange Theory
Introduction
A corpus of research has indicated that people share knowledge because of the perceived benefits attached with sharing such 
as earning a good reputation, hope of reciprocity, a sense of belonging to a professional community that one values, and 
satisfaction by helping others (Kalman, 1999; Wasko and Faraj, 2000). While most research focused on the positive aspects 
of knowledge sharing, there has been some evidence that suggests that knowledge sharing may pose public-good dilemmas
(i.e. benefits of knowledge sharing vs. costs of protecting against knowledge appropriation) for individual workers (Cabrera 
and Cabrera, 2002) and also for firms (Jordan and Lowe, 2004).
The dilemma (or tension) between knowledge sharing and knowledge protection is even more apparent in the case of 
academicians. On one hand, sharing knowledge could be beneficial because it may provide useful feedback, result in 
potential collaborations and networking with the like-minded colleagues, better access to academic resources, and hope for 
reciprocity in future. On the other hand, it is accompanied by a sense of fear that sharing could lead to knowledge 
misappropriation which in turn would result in loss of its uniqueness and originality.  This is more so the case when the 
research is in an unpublished stage (for example, conference papers), for much knowledge remains unprotectable and the 
chances that it could be exploited increase manifold. This tension could be even more manifest in the context of online 
information exchange where the world is at one’s doorstep: just one click away. While, electronic network has facilitated 
knowledge sharing, it could also make their research more vulnerable to exploitation. 
Even though the apparent tension between knowledge sharing and protection among academicians make the phenomenon 
worthy of investigation, there appears to be a dearth of research exploring the process of knowledge sharing among 
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academicians1. Therefore, the prime motivation for this paper lies in addressing the tension between benefits and costs of 
academic knowledge sharing especially on-line. The specific research question posed in this study is: What would an 
academician do when he or she is requested a conference paper via email by another member of the academia? To address 
the specific question, our attention is paid to two theories that could be used to explain the socio-psychological processes that 
guide the sharing behavior of the members of the broader community of academicians.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Arousal: Cost-Reward Model
Piliavin et al.’s (1981) Arousal: Cost-Reward Model, or simply cost-reward theory of helping is one of the major theories that 
has been used and validated not only in emergencies such as life-threatening situation (Piliavin et al., 1981) but also in non-
emergencies (see Fritsch et al., 2000; Kerber, 1984; Otten et al., 1988; Rushton, 1981; Weyant, 1978; Bart-Tal, 1976). From 
the perspective of cost-reward theory of helping, the initiation of the knowledge transaction by the unknown conference 
paper requester can be regarded equivalent to requesting help. The act of sharing the paper upon such request can be 
interpreted as helping in non-emergent situation. 
According to this model, the one who is requested to share the conference paper can be considered as a bystander who 
experiences psychological arousal when facing the request for help (i.e. psychological discomfort or distress). To remove the 
discomfort, he/she will go through weighing various benefits and costs to decide to help or not to help (i.e. share the paper or 
not). 
The most obvious personal cost of the conference paper sharing among academicians may be potential exploitation2 of ideas 
before the publication of research. Such exploitation involves significant negative psychological harm as well as loss of 
opportunity to publish, putting a scholar into seriously disadvantaged position. In theorizing the cost of helping based on the 
risk of misuse of the paper, we further divided it into two kinds of costs depending on the sources of potential misuse: risk of 
imitation that comes from (1) inquirer -specific and (2) inquirer- non-specific (See Table 1).
Table 1. Explanation of Knowledge sharing based on Arousal: Cost-reward model
Cost of sharing (helping) Reward of Sharing (helping)
Risk of imitation associated with the 
inquirer
Academic status of the inquirer
Potential misuse will be high when 
information requestor works on the 
same area without mentioning the 
proper use of the paper
Expert power (position and the 
institution) of the inquirer could indicate 
the overall quality of potential association 
benefits
Paper type General benefits associated with the act 
sharing
A conceptual paper could be misused 
easier than an empirical paper since the 
former comprises propositions/ideas 
yet to be empirically tested.
Regardless of the information requester 
characteristic, sharing the paper could 
incur benefits such as creating a positive 
image, claiming ownership, learning, 
potential future collaboration, access to 
resources, and getting feedback
Inquirer Non-specific
Source Type
Applying cost-reward model in conference paper sharing context
Inquirer Specific
1
 Academicians often codify their knowledge (or idea) in a paper-format and share it with colleagues in academia and practitioners by 
publishing at conferences, journals, magazines, and newspapers. In particular, it is a common practice for academicians to submit and share 
conference papers to get feedbacks for their research ideas from academic colleagues or find collaborators in an unpublished stage of 
research project. This study considers sharing knowledge using conference papers as a specific form of knowledge sharing among 
academicians and investigates factors determining their intention to share and assure a fair exchange.
2
 We acknowledge that even though there is acknowledgement about inappropriate use of ideas by students, the literature relating to 
plagiarism by academics is limited (Clark, 2006). See LaFollette (1992) for further information about various types of academicians’ 
misuse of others’ ideas.
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Cost of sharing can be attributed to inquirer specific characteristics. To elaborate, inquirer-specific cost of sharing a paper 
could be implied in the contents of the message by the information requester. It is expected that the potential misuse would 
be perceived as higher when the research interests of an information requester highly overlap with those of the information 
provider coupled with the fact that the requester does not mention how the information will be used (e.g., citation and 
copyright issues). In such a situation, an academician would be less willing to share the conference paper because there 
would be a higher likelihood that the information requester would engage in an opportunistic behavior. Moreover, the 
academician is also more likely to ensure a fair exchange (e.g. asking for a fair use of the materials, asking further questions 
about the use of the paper, and contacting coauthors to discuss about the sharing of the paper, etc.). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1: The higher the potential risk of misuse implied in the contents of the message by the information requester, the less 
willing is an academician to share the conference paper (H1a), and the more likely an academician is to ensure a fair 
exchange (H1b).
The cost of sharing could also be a result of inquirer non-specific characteristics such as the type of information that is 
requested. For example, paper type (empirical vs. conceptual paper) could suggest different levels of possibility of idea 
misuse. This bundling of theoretical argument, data, and methodology in an empirical paper is more likely to create a barrier 
to imitation (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) by others and would particularly hinder any attempts to imitate the whole piece of 
work. Even when such an attempt is made, it would require a significant amount of time to collect data. On the other hand, 
the potential misuse could be felt higher by an academician sharing a conceptual paper. It is because, in most cases, all the 
conceptual definitions, theoretical foundations and key propositions are included in the conceptual conference paper.  Given 
these high risks, an academician is expected to put considerable effort in ensuring a fair exchange. Thus, the following 
hypotheses are made:
H2: When the conference paper is a conceptual paper, the less willing an academician to share the paper (H2a) and the more 
concerned an academician to ensure the fair exchange (H2b).
Likewise, the rewards of helping could also be categorized as inquirer-specific and inquirer-non-specific. Inquirer specific 
rewards are associated with the academic status of the information requester. Academic status could indicate expert power of 
the inquirer measured in terms of professional standing in the academic community as well as in terms of the institutional 
affiliations of the inquirer. Expert power of the inquirer could also indicate the overall quality of the potential association
benefits. Inquirer non-specific reward implies that regardless of the information requester’s status, sharing as such could offer
general benefits such as creating a positive image, access to academic resources, future collaborations and getting feedback, 
signaling ownership and learning. 
When the academic status is perceived higher, the reward of helping would increase the likelihood of sharing the paper and 
would lower the concern to ensure a fair exchange. Similarly, when the general benefits associated with the act of sharing
itself would be perceived higher, there would be an increased likelihood of sharing of paper and decreased concern to ensure 
a fair exchange. Thus we hypothesize that:
H3: The higher the academic status of an inquirer, the more willing an academician to share the conference paper (H3a) and 
the less concerned an academician to ensure a fair exchange (H3b).
H4: The higher the general benefits associated with the act of sharing, the more willing an academician to share the paper
(H4a), and the less concerned an academician to ensure a fair exchange (H4b).
Based on the cost-reward theory of helping, we expect that there could be interaction effects between the perceived reward
and cost of sharing surrounding the decision regarding conference paper sharing and ensuring a fair exchange. However, the 
specific patterns of the interaction effects are not hypothesized since we are unsure of how the different types of costs and 
benefits of sharing are going to be intermingled.
Generalized Exchange and Social Norms of Sharing
While Blau’s (1964) theory of social exchange explained social exchange in terms of a set of dyadic transactions, Emerson 
(1976) attempted to free the exchange theory off its dyadic tradition and extended the analysis to a larger social structure, 
making it a generalized or an indirect exchange. This notion of exchange networks or generalized exchange (Emerson, 1976; 
Yamagashi and Cook, 1993) refers to the unidirectional/unilateral process wherein what one actor gives to the other is not 
dependent upon what he/she has received from the former. To elaborate, if actor A helps actors B in the network, actor B 
does not return the favor directly to actor A. Rather actor A receives the benefit from somebody else (say actor C) in the 
network. From the perspective of generalized exchange, the act of sharing a paper upon request could be interpreted in terms 
of group norms that expect that each member contributes some resources to the network at large and gets some benefit in 
return from the network. 
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Applying this perspective to the case of academicians, one can predict that if a member of the academia perceives that the 
norms of the academic community encourage knowledge sharing then he/she will have an intention to share. In such a case, 
academicians will also be less occupied with ensuring a fair exchange since it is the faith in the cooperative intention of the 
academic community owing to the social norms that justifies the exchange intention. The following hypotheses are therefore 
advanced.
H5: The more an academician perceives that the social norms of the academic community encourage sharing, the more 
he/she will intend to share (H5a), and the less he/she would be concerned with ensuring a fair exchange (H5b).
Methods
Sample and Procedures
The study’s target subjects were the first authors of the conference papers accepted by one of the major academic conferences 
in the management area in 2006. Out of 2,886 paper sessions, after excluding those first authors who had more than one 
paper accepted, 2,089 first authors were identified from the conference catalog, as the eligible participants for the survey. 
Since we adopted a quasi-experimental approach3, after developing four versions of a scenario each of which representing 
four different experimental conditions, we randomly assigned these first authors to one of four manipulation conditions4. 
Then we sent them an email with a link to the online questionnaires three weeks before the conference5, assuring anonymity 
and voluntary participation. After taking out 295 delivery failures, the emails reached 1,794 first authors. Out of this, 725 first 
authors responded, resulting in 40.4% response rate. 
After removing unusable responses, a total of 530 responses were used for analysis. The respondents who comprised the final 
analysis sample were mostly academician (98%). Sixty-three percent were women; sixty-one percent were young 
academicians (graduate students = 38%; assistant professor = 33%); eight-two percent were from the schools with doctoral 
programs.  Almost half of the respondents were from the U.S. (53%). We compared available demographic data (gender, 
profession, and geography) between those who responded and not responded, and found no evidence of systemic response 
bias. 
Measures and Manipulations
Dependent variables
Sharing intention was measured using a Likert-type seven points scale comprising three items. An example item is “The 
chance that I would share the paper is”. Cronbach  on these items was 0.74. Assurance intention measured the extent to 
which a person performs precautious actions before sharing the paper. Four items were used to investigate the intention. An 
example is “Before sharing, I would ask the person how my paper would be used.” Cronbach  on these items was 0.74.
Independent variables
The study had five independent variables. Two of the independent variables (inquirer specific reward and cost of helping) 
were manipulated, and three were observed. The first two observed variables were inquirer non-specific cost and reward of 
helping. Paper type was coded 1 if the paper was conceptual and 0 if it was an empirical one. To measure the general benefits 
of sharing itself, respondents were asked to indicate “all the potential opportunities you could gain by sharing your 
conference paper with someone else”. The variable was measured by counting responses to the six items. These included, 
getting valuable feedback, creating a positive image, signaling my ownership of an academic idea, learning, gaining access to 
resources (e.g. sample, database, etc.), and developing future collaboration/networking. The third observed independent 
variable was social norms. It was measured using Lewis et al.’s (2003) two-item scale. An example item is, “People who 
influence my career believe that I should share my academic ideas.” The internal reliability of the items was .63. 
3
 Some may call this scenario methodology (Gómez et al., 2000) or policy capturing methodology (Karren and Barringer, 2002)
4
 Each author is assigned into one of the four manipulation cells for examining paper sharing under the different level of risks and benefits. 
They are: high risk of imitation-high academic status (HRHA), high risk of imitation-low academic status (HRLA), low risk of imitation-
high academic status (LRHA), and low risk of imitation -low academic status (LRLA) situation.
5
 We sent the survey before starting the conference to prevent the potential intervention of uncontrollable factors on paper sharing decision 
making (e.g., personal contact during the conference session).
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Manipulations
Two of the independent variables (inquirer specific reward and cost of helping) were manipulated. This resulted in four 
scenarios (2x2) in total. Participants read one of two paragraphs that suggested different levels of risk of imitation associated 
with the inquirer when the conference paper is shared. In the email scenario, the participants in high risk of imitation 
associated with the inquirer condition, read a paragraph that states, “Our research interests and ideas are very similar. I have 
been working on this topic for the last five years and in fact having ongoing projects on the same topic. Your conceptual 
definitions and findings could be tremendous help in extending and advancing my research further. Therefore, I was 
wondering if it would be possible for you to share a copy of your conference paper with me.” On the other hand, the 
participants in low risk imitation condition read a paragraph, “I must confess that this area is completely new to me. In fact 
your paper introduced me to it. Out of intellectual curiosity, I wanted to know more about your work and was wondering if it 
would be possible for you to share a copy of your conference paper with me. If I ever get to work in the related area in the 
future, I will make sure that your work is fully cited and that any copyright issue is given due respect.” We dummy coded the 
risk of imitation associated with the inquirer condition (1= high risk, 0 = low risk). 
To manipulate academic status of the inquirer we varied information requester’s academic position, academic affiliation, and 
also position in professional society in the introductory paragraph of the email as well as in the signature. Participants in the 
high academic status of the inquirer condition read an email from a sender who identifies himself as a professor and a chair 
of the department in a business school of one of the universities listed in the extensive research university category in 
Carnegie classification. The sender also identified himself being on the editorial board of a top academic journal. On the 
other hand, participants in the low academic status of the inquirer condition read an email from a sender identifying himself 
as a graduate student in a business school of one of the university listed in the intensive research university category in 
Carnegie classification. 
Manipulation checks
We used a two-item scale to check if the risk of imitation associated with the inquirer was successfully manipulated as we 
intended. An example item is, “the inquirer could potentially exploit my ideas and present them as his own.”  These items 
were found to have a strong reliability (Cronbach  = 0.88). A significant difference was found between the two groups (MH
= 4.27 and ML = 3.90, t = 2.79, p < .01). Thus, we concluded that risk of imitation associated with the inquirer was 
successfully manipulated. 
Three items were used to check the manipulation of the academic status of the conference paper requester. Respondents were 
asked how much they agreed with statements such as “He seems to be a very influential person in the field.” High reliability 
of the items was demonstrated (Cronbach  = 0.70). A significant mean difference between high academic status condition 
and low academic status condition was found (MH = 5.22 and ML = 3.34, t = 21.87, p < .001), suggesting that our 
manipulation was successful. 
Control Variables. Four control variables were adopted in this study. Social desirability was measured by adapting a ten-
item instrument by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972).  Profession was measured by examining whether the respondent is a 
practitioner or an academician (1 = practitioner, 0 = academician). We also measured frequency of the conference attendance
by asking an open-ended question “how many times did you attend the conference?” Finally, belief in the fair system
measured the extent to which a person believes in the existence of a governance mechanism related to knowledge sharing in 
academia. 
Results
A correlation matrix is provided in Table 2. The table also provides mean and standard deviation information of each variable 
investigated in the study. To test our hypotheses, we ran two separate analysis of covariance6 for each dependent variable. 
Table 3 presents the results.
Hypothesis 1a and 1b predicted that the risk of imitation associated with the inquirer would be related with intention to share 
the conference paper and to ensure a fair exchange. The results indicated that the risk of imitation associated with the inquirer
did not predict sharing intention (F1, 477 = 2.44, n.s.), but predicted assurance intention (F1, 477 = 6.13, p < .05). Thus ,
Hypothesis 1a was not supported, but Hypothesis 1b was. 
6 We also tested MANCOVA and the results were consistent with our ANCOVA results but the relationships came out stronger in general. 
To be conservative we showed the results from ANOVA here.
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Hypothesis 2a and 2b suggested a main effect of paper type on sharing intention and assurance intention respectively. We 
predicted that when the request was to share a conceptual paper, a researcher would be less willing to share and more willing 
to ensure a fair exchange. As expected, the conference participants associated with a conceptual paper, showed less 
willingness to share the paper (F1, 477 = 8.22, p < .01) and more willingness to ensure a fair exchange (F1, 477 = 8.22, p < .05). 
Thus Hypothesis 2a and 2b were also supported. 
Table 2. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlations among Variablesab
Mean Stdev  1 2 3 4 
1 Sharing Intention 5.53 1.25 (0.74)
2 Assurance Intention 4.43 1.77 -0.54 *** (0.74)
3 Perceived academic status 4.21 1.36 0.16 *** 0.11 * (0.70)
4 Perceived risk of imitation associated with the inquirer 4.08 1.52 -0.30 *** 0.18 *** 0.02 (0.88)
5 Paper Type 0.27 0.45 -0.07 0.11 * -0.05 0.06
6 General benefits associated with the act of sharing 4.42 1.42 0.13 ** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.02
7 Social norms 5.48 1.10 0.37 *** -0.25 *** 0.12 ** -0.16 ***
8 Social desirability 3.99 1.15 0.10 * -0.11 * -0.07 0.11 *
9 Frequency of  the conference attendance 4.07 4.86 0.16 *** -0.30 *** -0.20 *** -0.01
10 Profession 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.10 * 0.04 0.06
11 Belief in the fair system 3.78 1.51 0.16 *** 0.02 0.13 ** -0.27 ***
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Sharing Intention
2 Assurance Intention
3 Perceived academic status
4 Perceived risk of imitation associated with the 
5 Paper Type
6 General benefits associated with the act of sharing 0.03
7 Social norms
-0.01 0.18 *** (0.63)
8 Social desirability 0.00 0.09 * 0.13 **
9 Frequency of  the conference attendance
-0.04 -0.04 0.14 ** 0.09 *
10 Profession 0.04 0.09 * 0.02 0.01 -0.08
11 Belief in the fair system 0.05 0.13 ** 0.20 *** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 (0.86)
a. * p < .05    ** p < .01    *** p < .001 (Two-tailed tests)        
b. The numbers in the parenthesis are coefficient alphas.
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Table 3. Univariate Test Resultsabc
Mean F Mean F
H1 Risk of imitation associated High 5.34 ( 0.12 ) 2.44 ( 1 , 477 ) 4.72 1 ( 0.17 ) 6.13 * ( 1 , 477 )
with the inquirer (RI) Low 5.37 ( 0.12 ) 4.15 1 ( 0.18 )
H2 Paper type Conceptual 5.23 ( 0.13 ) 8.22 ** ( 1 , 477 ) 4.72 2 ( 0.19 ) 4.83 * ( 1 , 477 )
(PT) Empirical 5.46 ( 0.11 ) 4.18 2 ( 0.16 )
H3 Inquirer's academic status High 5.49 ( 0.12 ) 1.95 ( 1 , 477 ) 4.72 ( 0.17 ) 2.17 ( 1 , 477 )
(AS) Low 5.22 ( 0.12 ) 4.13 ( 0.18 )
H4 General benefits associated None 3.75 3456 ( 0.50 ) 4.64 *** ( 6 , 477 ) 4.29 ( 0.73 ) 1.88 ( 6 , 477 )
with the act of sharing (GB) One 6.24 3 ( 0.38 ) 3.44 ( 0.55 )
Two 5.34 ( 0.24 ) 4.60 ( 0.35 )
Three 5.20 ( 0.15 ) 4.75 ( 0.22 )
Four 5.39 4 ( 0.12 ) 4.72 ( 0.17 )
Five 5.68 5 ( 0.12 ) 4.20 ( 0.18 )
Six 5.49 6 ( 0.10 ) 4.71 ( 0.15 )
8.83 ** ( 1 , 477 ) 0.01 ( 1 , 477 )
6.23 * ( 1 , 477 ) 3.12 ( 1 , 477 )
3.56 ** ( 4 , 477 ) 0.68 ( 4 , 477 )
H5 Social norms 53.91 *** ( 1 , 477 ) 2.02 ( 1 , 477 )
Social desirabillity 0.78 ( 1 , 477 ) 0.87 ( 1 , 477 )
Frequnce of conference 
attendance 5.63 * ( 1 , 477 ) 31.63 *** ( 1 , 477 )
Profession 0.00 ( 1 , 477 ) 3.73 ( 1 , 477 )
Belief in the fair system 3.81 ( 1 , 477 ) 0.66 ( 1 , 477 )
Relevant 
Hypothesis
AS × RI
AS × RI × PT
AS × RI × GB
Sharing intention Assurance intention
Variables Categories, if relevant (SE) (SE)(df1, df2) (df1, df2)
a. * p < .05    ** p < .01    *** p < .001    (Two-tailed tests)    
b. Cells that share the same number as the subscript showed meaningful difference by Bonferoni procedure.
c. Only three significant interaction effects are shown for simplicity sake although the model was full factorial (2x2x2x7) with covariates.
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Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted the effect of the academic status of the inquirer on academicians’ willingness to 
share the paper and to assure a fair exchange respectively. None of the results were found to be statistically 
significant. Thus both Hypotheses 3a and 3b were not supported. 
Hypothesis 4a was supported (F6, 477 = 4.64, p < .001) confirming that the more general benefits an academician 
perceives associated with the act of sharing the more he/she would be willing to share the paper. We further 
conducted a post hoc analysis based on Bonferoni procedure to detect pairs of sharing benefits categories that 
produced the overall main effect.  Out of all the possible pairs, the significance difference was detected in only four 
pairs (See Table 3 for details). The general pattern was that when academicians perceived no benefit associated with 
the act of sharing as opposed to some benefits (one, four, five, or six), they were clearly less willing to share the 
paper.  Hypothesis 4b which predicted that the amount of sharing benefits would be related with ensuring fair 
exchange, however, was not supported. 
Based on the notion of generalized exchange, we argued that social norms of sharing would predict willingness to 
share the conference paper (Hypothesis 5a), and assurance for a fair exchange (Hypothesis 5b). The perceived social 
norms of sharing were found to be significantly associated with the willingness to share (F1, 477  = 53.91, p < .001) 
thus providing support for Hypothesis 5a. But the social norm did not predict assurance intention for a fair exchange 
(F1, 477  = 2.02, n.s.). Thus Hypothesis 5b was not supported.
Out of the all the possible interactions, three significant interaction effects were found to be significantly related 
with sharing intention. None of interaction effects were significantly associated with assurance intention. Firstly, 
there was a significant two-way interaction effect between academic status of an inquirer and risk of imitation 
associated with the inquirer on paper sharing intention (F1, 477 = 8.83, p < .01). The significant two-way interaction 
effect is depicted in Figure 1. It was generally expected that there would be a negative. The expected negative 
association between the risk of imitation and the willingness to share the paper was confirmed when the request to 
share the paper came from an inquirer with low academic status.  However, interestingly, a positive association was 
found when the same request came from an inquirer with high academic status. 
Figure 1. Two-way Interaction Effect on Sharing Intention
Secondly, two significant three-way interaction effects were found to be significant. These included those among:
(1) academic status of an inquirer, risk of imitation associated with the inquirer, and conceptual paper (F1, 477  = 6.23, 
p < .05); and (2) academic status of an inquirer, risk of imitation associated with the inquirer, and general benefits 
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associated with the act of sharing (F6, 477  = 3.56, p < .01). These three-way interaction effects are depicted in Figure 
2 and Figure 3 respectively. Figure 2a shows that the significant two-way interaction that we found in Figure 1 holds
true when the conference paper is empirical. However, the two-way interaction effect gets weaker when the 
conference paper is a conceptual one. We can clearly see that the angular slope difference becomes flatter in Figure 
2b. This finding indicates that the paper type moderates the two-way interaction effects. 
Figure 2. Three-way Interaction Effect on Sharing Intention (1)
Figure 3. Three-way Interaction Effect on Sharing Intention (2)
Figure 2a: Empirical paper Figure 2b: Conceptual paper
Figure 3a: Academic status of the inquirer is low Figure 3b: Academic status of the inquirer is high
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Lastly, Figure 3 depicts another three-way interaction effect. It contains a pair of plots (Figure 3a and 3b) each 
depicting the moderating effect of general benefits associated with the act of sharing on the relationship between risk 
of imitation (associated with the inquirer) and willingness to share. Figure 3 suggests that the moderating effect of 
general benefits associated with the act of sharing on the relationship between risk of imitation (associated with the 
inquirer) and sharing intention is stronger when the inquirer’s academic status is high (Figure 3b) than when it is low
(Figure 3a). The angular differences between the slopes representing “none” and all the other categories in Figure 3a
were smaller than those between the slopes in Figure 3b. Academicians showed the least willingness to share the 
paper when the inquirer had a low academic status, the risk of imitation associated with the inquirer was high, and 
no general benefits associated with the act of sharing were perceived. 
An analysis of the effect size suggests that the most significant portion of the effect size was made by variables 
based on the cost-reward theory of helping (See Figure 4). However, one variable alone (i.e. social norm) based on 
social exchange theory explained 8% of the variance of sharing intention and 5% of the assurance intention. 
Considering the parsimony, social norms was a fairly strong indicator of academicians’ knowledge sharing.
Sharing intention Assurance intention
Error
74%
Control variables
2%
Main effects of cost-
reward variables
5%
Interaction effects 
between cost-
reward variables
11%
Social norms of 
sharing
8%
Error
77%
Control variables
6% Main effects of cost-
reward variables
5%
Interaction effects 
between cost-
reward variables
7%
Social norms of 
sharing
5%
Figure 4. Graphical Depiction of the Relative Effect Sizes
Discussion
Our study is one of the first empirical attempts to understand conference paper sharing behavior of academicians, 
one of the forms of knowledge sharing among academicians that has not been researched much. Our research 
suggests that academicians, on one hand, indeed weigh the benefits and costs associated with sharing the conference 
paper and then decide their intention  to share or intention to ensure a fair exchange based on such calculations. 
However, on the other hand, academicians follow the social norms that come from the sense of belonging to the 
academy and may not necessarily seek fair transaction at a dyadic level, thus making a unilateral transaction under 
the social norms of sharing as indicated by the generalized exchange.
The results of our research indicate that sharing decision could be a function of weighing benefits and costs, but 
assuring decision could be mainly driven by perception of cost by the academicians. Further investigation of the 
academicians’ pattern of weighing benefits and costs associated with willingness to share may provide a clue to the 
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question: when the costs and benefits are pitted against each other, which is the deciding factor for the sharing 
decision? The three significant interaction effects from our study suggest that it could be benefits (especially 
benefits coming from being associated with academicians with high academic status) that outweigh the costs. As it 
can be seen in Figure 1, when the request was from an academician with higher academic status, despite the high 
risk of imitation associated with the inquirer, the participants showed high willingness to share. This may imply that
the potential benefits associated with a high academic status of the inquirer outweigh the perceived risk of imitation 
associated with the inquirer. The same pattern was found in two significant three-way interaction effects.
It is also worth noting that the inquirer-specific cost-reward items worked as moderators rather than having main 
effects on sharing intention. This suggests that academicians generally intend to share the paper when the paper is 
empirical and when there are some benefits associated with the act of sharing, but that trend gets stronger or weaker 
depending on the inquirer-specific cost-reward items such as academic status and risk of imitation associated with 
the inquirer suggested by the inquirer. 
The results of our paper imply that an academic community could develop a strategic plan to have a governance 
system and culture that motivates knowledge sharing among its members. For example, our research suggests that 
sharing intention was significantly lower when the paper type is conceptual as opposed to when it is empirical. Clear 
guidelines with respect to specific paper type could promote sharing without jeopardizing intellectual property could 
be helpful. 
Our study also provides academicians with useful insights on how to effectively share knowledge with other 
academicians in their community. Since the academic status of the information requester was a strong motivator for 
a fellow academician to share knowledge, highlighting one’s credibility based on academic achievement could be 
also helpful in obtaining knowledge. To be fair, however, our research also suggests that the rich might get richer 
and the poor get poorer since the academic status of the inquirer was one of the most important considerations in the 
decision regarding conference paper sharing. Academicians with high academic status are in a better position to 
absorb new knowledge from other colleagues than those who are relatively not, for example graduate students. 
Although from a different perspective, one could also argue that this represents a fair transaction since academic 
status could be considered a valid yardstick to measure an academician’s contribution to the academic society. 
Our research is not without limitations. First of all, our dependent variable was the intention surrounding conference 
paper sharing and also ensuring a fair exchange. So we add a caution for the readers in interpreting result to 
acknowledge that although the intention might be high, not all the intentions could lead to the action. Secondly, 
conference participants might be more prone to sharing thus generalizing the results to overall population of 
academicians who are not active in terms of participating academic conferences should be avoided. Finally, our 
research results were drawn from one major conference in management area, so generalization to other types of 
academicians is not appropriate. 
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